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The theme of the Ecclesiastical Law Society’s 2010Day Conference, held on March 13 in London, was“Freedom of religion: protection or equality?”
One of the speakers, Lucy Vickers, professor of law at
Oxford Brookes University and specialist on religious
discrimination in the workplace, declared that in her
opinion the fundamental ground for legally protecting
religious belief and practice is the essential irrationality of
religious positions: since their truth cannot, unlike
scientific views, be demonstrated, they need the protection
of the law even more than do other ideas.  Another speaker,
Christopher McCrudden, professor of human rights law at
the University of Oxford, indicated that he felt very
uncomfortable with this argument, though there was no
time at the conference to go into the issue in depth.
Then, a little over a month later (April 29), Lord Justice
Laws issued his opinion in the case of McFarlane v Relate
Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ B1 on appeal from the
Employment Appeal Tribunal. Gary McFarlane, a
relationships counselor in Bristol with strong evangelical
Christian beliefs, had refused to provide sexual counseling
to homosexual couples; as a result, he was dismissed by the
Relate Avon organisation, whose position was upheld by
the Employment Tribunal. Lord Justice Laws denied
McFarlane’s subsequent application to have his case heard
by the Court of Appeal. The Lord Justice gave his ratio as
follows: “[I]n the eye of everyone save the believer
religious faith is necessarily subjective, being
incommunicable by any kind of proof or evidence. . . . [I]t
lies only in the heart of the believer, who is alone bound by
it.  No one else is or can be so bound, unless by his own
free choice he accepts its claims.  The promulgation of law
for the protection of a position held purely on religious
grounds cannot therefore be justified. It is irrational, as
preferring the subjective over the objective” (paras 23-24).
These remarks created a considerable flap in the press,
and former Archbishop George Carey took sharp issue
with Lord Justice Laws’ refusal to allow McFarlane’s
appeal.  Some critics reasoned ad hominem, condemning
Laws LJ on the basis of his reputation as a “legal activist.”  
But the especially interesting aspect of the  decision is
that, whilst agreeing entirely with Professor Vickers’ view
that religion is essentially subjective, and therefore
unprovable and irrational, Laws LJ concludes that, instead
of particularly deserving the protection of the law, religious
claims must not be upheld legally against the (non-
religious) views of others. In other words, from the
premise of religious irrationality, Vickers and Laws draw
precisely opposite conclusions!
In the present essayist’s view, neither Vickers nor Laws is
correct, and for three compelling reasons: (1) It is
incorrect to suppose that ideological conflicts in society pit
“religious” beliefs against “non-religious” positions. (2)
Religious beliefs are not necessarily irrational. (3) A proper
basis for the protection – and the limitation – of religious
practices must be found in an entirely different realm from
that of supposed “religious irrationality.”  Let us briefly
speak to each of these points.
1. The 20th-century theologian Paul Tillich stressed that
there are in fact no atheists, since everyone has an
“ultimate concern”—a value system determining his or
her actions individually and societally. Thus, in
McFarlane, Relate Avon, no less than McFarlane himself,
held religious convictions—for Relate Avon, that
homosexual relationships are ethically proper and as
such deserve the benefits of sexual counseling no less
than heterosexual relationships. Lord Justice Laws
himself therefore acted irrationally in rejecting on
grounds of religious irrationality McFarlane’s overt
religiosity in favour of Relate Avon’s unstated, but no
less religious, value system.
2. As for the claim by Vickers and Laws that religions are
per se irrational, we might paraphrase George Orwell:  all
religions are equal, but some are more equal than others.
There are indeed religions such as Buddhism that rely
100 per cent on personal, subjective experience as
verification for their beliefs, as well as cultic movements
such as Scientology having no way of objectively
demonstrating the factuality of their doctrines (eg, that
“body thetans” are the product of Xenu of the Galactic
Confederacy and need to be treated through therapeutic
“auditing” processes).  But this is hardly a description all
religious phenomena.  An obvious counter-example is
classic Christian faith, which centres on the historical
facts of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.  The
centuries-old discipline of Christian apologetics has
offered powerful objective evidences for the truth of the
Christian worldview; one thinks of the work of Pascal,
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William Paley, John Henry Newman, C S Lewis, Richard
Swinburne—and lawyers such as Hugo Grotius (De
veritate religionis Christianae), Simon Greenleaf (The
Testimony of the Evangelists)—and Sir Norman Anderson,
late director of the University of London’s Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies (The Evidence for the Resurrection).
In recent years, the arguments for cosmic, universal
“intelligent design” as presented by scientists such as
William Dembski and Francis Collins have brought even
distinguished atheistic philosophers (eg, Antony Flew)
to belief in God.  
3. Where, then, should one go to find an adequate basis for
the protection of religious beliefs and practices—and
proper grounds for limiting them?  The answer is not to
label religion as “irrational” and then to draw positive or
negative conclusions from that characterisation, but
rather to consider far more carefully the proper
function of law in general in an open society.  As
political philosopher John Rawls emphasised by way of
his First Principle of Justice (that dealing with civil
liberties): “Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
others.”  This means that unless one’s belief or desired
activity—including religious belief and activity—hurts
others, it should be allowed.  It also means that if the
courts can find a way for a belief or activity to function
without significant hurt to others, that belief or activity
should be legitimated.  In the McFarlane matter,
therefore, since other relationship counsellors holding
worldviews other than McFarlane’s could readily treat
the homosexual couples, McFarlane should have been
allowed to retain his position—respect being shown to
his personal beliefs by allowing him to give sex therapy
only to heterosexual couples.  (This is in line with
medical practice in many civilized countries, where
physicians and nurses opposing abortion do not have
their public hospital privileges taken away, but are
exempted from performing abortions and instead are
assigned to perform other medical procedures.)
There is a further consideration of the greatest
consequence to the judicial evaluation of religious belief
and practice.  That principle is encapsulated in a celebrated
remark attributed to Voltaire: “I may not agree with what
you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”
In an open society, even beliefs regarded by some as
“irrational” need to be tolerated. Why? Because of the
inherent dignity of the human persons holding those ideas.
We need a free marketplace of ideas, not a society where
some ideas  (religious ones, for example) are given such
second-class status that actions dependent on them are per
se removed from legal protection—even when their alleged
harm to the society cannot be demonstrated. Today, in
certain European states, one can be jailed for unpopular
ideas (holocaust revisionism, for example); such obnoxious
notions ought to be refuted in the public marketplace of
ideas, not repressed by law.  Religious beliefs, even those
we disagree with, need to expressed—and practiced—in
an open society.  And, surely, those religious positions with
solid, objective evidence in their behalf must not suffer
ostracism simply because of their religious label!
Otherwise, political correctness will prevail, and political
correctness is no less a religion because it does not use that
terminology. Indeed, in many ways it is far more dangerous
to the public weal than are the religious ideas and practices
it endeavours to repress. 
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